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CBS InDepth:
Debate over the
Insider
By Leslie McKinnon
CBC News Online,
November 2003
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The battle against tobacco giants is escalating. It's a story of secret
documents and studies of private files made public, and of a famous
whistle blower who has shaken the whole industry. Now Canada's
anti-smoking lobby has some new ammunition. On November 22, 1999, the
federal government released 1,200 pages of tobacco industry documents,
and they paint a disturbing picture; revealing how tobacco companies
researched ways to reinforce addiction, and how they target young
people.
Dr. Jeffrey Wigand was once a top tobacco scientist at Brown and
Williamson Tobacco in Louisville, Kentucky. He's in Canada now to aid
health groups in deciphering a windfall of tobacco documents released by
Health Canada. He has become an international celebrity since his
tortured disclosure of tobacco company secrets in 1993 turned into the
gripping plot-line of a major Hollywood movie, The Insider.
The Insider begins with Wigand's pursuit by CBS 60 Minutes
producer Lowell Bergman, played by Al Pacino. And it culminated with a
dramatic interview with host Mike Wallace, played by Christopher
Plummer.
Later it was, in part, Wigand's detailed and knowledgable testimony that
led to the five big tobacco companies in the U.S. paying out billions of
dollars in settlement in the face of lawsuits filed by the attorneys
general of dozens of U.S. states, as well as numerous lawsuits filed by
victims of smoking. Documents used or released in those lawsuits
revealed, for the first time, that tobacco companies did market
cigarettes to youth and carefully studied addiction and disease, but
kept their information secret. This was in the U.S.; not a lot was known
about Canadian tobacco companies -- until now.
British American tobacco, or BATCO, the parent company of Canada's
Imperial Tobacco, was forced by a U.S. court to release millions of
documents. Health Canada has culled 1,200 of them. Some shed light on
research and into manipulation of nicotine by cigarette makers,
including Imperial.
One document shows that Imperial Tobacco, as early as 1971, studied what
it called "fortification of nicotine." The research recommends the
addition of chemicals, especially ammonia,
"to increase the acceptable physiological satisfaction of smoke
from normal cigarette blends by increasing the transfer to smoke of
total and extractable nicotine."
Another Imperial document from 1985 describes its interest in
"breeding varieties of tobacco in which the nicotine content can
be controlled. The primary use of such tobacco would be as a source
of high nicotine in our blends."
Jeffrey Wigand became well versed in tobacco companies' eagerness to
boost the nicotine impact of cigarettes. As a tobacco scientist, he
attended a research meeting in 1989 in Vancouver, which included
Imperial Tobacco scientists. The conference discussed the adding of
ammonia to tobacco to enhance nicotine and the development of a high
nicotine yielding tobacco plant, known as Y-1. But later, according to
Wigand, tobacco company lawyers dictated that most of the minutes of
that meeting be destroyed.
"This was document management, or removal of documents that could become
controversial in litigation," Wigand said.
On November 23, Wigand was appointed a special adviser to Health Canada
on tobacco-related issues.
Health Minister Allan Rock said Wigand will help his department analyze
and interpret the thousands of pages of internal tobacco documents.
Rock says the documents are filled with code words that Wigand can help
decipher. He says Wigand will also work with Health Canada officials on
developing strategies to keep teenagers away from cigarettes.
"Canadian companies, just like the American companies, have been
manipulating people, have been doing research to focus on the young and
to focus on people who might want to quit smoking," Rock said.
But unlike the United States, the federal government doesn't plan to
launch any lawsuits against the tobacco industry. (British Columbia is
suing).
Imperial Tobacco has denied the allegations that it markets to young
children and manipulates the nicotine levels in cigarettes. The company
says the documents are being taken out of context by anti-smoking
groups.
On November 22, Brian Stewart interviewed Dr Jeffrey Wigand and
Michel Descoteaux:
BRIAN STEWART: Now joining us is the real insider, Dr. Jeffrey
Wigand. Dr. Wigand, you were at that meeting in Vancouver. How evident
was this, what appears to be a culture of deception, throughout the
conference?
DR. JEFFREY WIGAND / FORMER TOBACCO EXECUTIVE: Well I think
you have -- well I don't say, don't say there's a cultural deception
throughout the conference. I think the conference really reflected the
opinions and thoughts of the sciences of each of the company. I think
what you see is the end product, which reflects their concern about
having controversial topics discussed by their science -- scientists,
that would ultimately, maybe disclosed or produced in litigation, is a
different form of deception. I mean clearly there's a difference between
the original Minutes and what was, I think, is a clearly sanitized or
"vanilla meeting" minutes that were done by somebody who did not
participate in the meeting and who was a lawyer.
STEWART: You have, you said in the, earlier on, we heard you say
that there really was no difference between the Canadian industries and
Americans, in terms of the manipulation of nicotine and the practices.
Were you aware of that all along, and did it cause you some wry
amusement to think that the Canadians were taking this high horse?
WIGAND: Well I think the industry as a whole, whether it be
Canadian, American or European, have the same intent; they want to
deliver an addictive substance in a controlled fashion, which is
nicotine to consumers. And the more consumers they addict -- and the way
they manipulate or design a cigarette is to deliver nicotine, an
addictive substance.
STEWART: They're talking, at times, about getting a sort of
'optimal level' of nicotine. What exactly does that mean and how is that
done?
WIGAND: There are many ways to do it. In the States, they do it
through chemicals, additives such as ammonia. Other ways of doing it is
by selection of leaf blends or different leaf that goes into the
cigarette that have different concentrations of nicotine. The industry
has nurtured a belief that all a cigarette is, is a natural product; you
know, kind of grown in the ground, harvested, wrapped in paper. Well
it's not. It's a meticulously engineered design product. It has
ventilation; it has packing density; it has lip release; it has lots of
design characteristics that facilitate the delivery of nicotine.
STEWART: The documents seem to suggest, certainly today's
documents, that they had two basic objectives they were quite concerned
about in the, by the early '80's. And that is you had the older smokers;
how to keep them hooked, and how to get new recruits. What was that --
how was that developed?
WIGAND: Well I think the industry survives by capturing young
smokers. And young smokers, I mean under 18. And they know that 85 per
cent of today's smokers in Canada and the United States come from people
under the age of 18. And in fact if you hook them young, you hook them
for life. And that's the philosophy they use; they prey on the children.
Children are the future sales, future profits.
STEWART: Was there an attempt, though, to also introduce sort of
light tobaccos in the belief that that would somehow be safer and so was
okay, so you can get them younger that way.
WIGAND: Well, there is that. There is a myth that a light is
better. I mean the moniker has been really exploited. That is, as we
know, we're in a nicotine delivery business and tar is the negative
baggage. Tar is the negative component; that's the one that's involved
in really dramatic diseases. As you reduce tar, you're supposed to
reduce risk, biological risk. Well tar goes down and when you talk about
light tar, you talk less tar. Ultra light; less tar. However, what's
designed into a cigarette is the ability for a cigarette to give more
than what is reported in a normal machine and it has what is called
elasticity, such that the smoker needs to take a deeper puff, take more
frequent puffs, smoke more cigarettes to feed their addiction. And
that's designed into the cigarette. And lights communicate reduced
health risk, but in truly, they're not a reduced health risk.
STEWART:If you go through the documents, there's area after area --
one here in particular, where they talk about the need to get rid of
some existing files that could be used in lawsuits in the United States.
There was a willing attempt here to hide, forever, these discussions,
these minutes that were going on, correct?
WIGAND: That's correct.
STEWART: They never believed it would come out?
WIGAND: I don't think so, I think the industry had had, or has
had, an arrogance that they would never be called to be responsible.
STEWART: When you became the famous whistleblower, how tough did
it get on you? For those that don't know your story, how hard were they
prepared to play?
WIGAND: They played very hard. They tried to intimidate me; they
held me hostage to my severance and healthcare benefits. They had every
facet of my life investigated.
STEWART: There were physical threats against you even, I gather?
WIGAND: There were physical threats, even though we couldn't find
out who was responsible for those physical threats. But just being sued
and having my First Amendment rights in the United States taken away in
a Kentucky court without being represented by a counsel to me is, is
intimidating; to be followed is intimidating; to have my divorce
attorney's office broken into is intimidating; to have my lawyer's car
broken into in Washington DC and have the records pertaining to my
lawsuit removed, when there was other valuables in the care. To have my
briefcase, during depositions in Louisville, Kentucky removed by a Brown
And Williamson attorney; that's intimidating.
STEWART: It's very rare that one meets somebody who is a subject
of a film. I mean "The Insider" that so many people are going to see
now. What did you make of it? What do you feel about it, when you see
it?
WIGAND: Well my initial reaction was a little bit of
apprehension. When I finally saw it in June of this year with my
13-year-old daughter, I was very pleased that it accurately prevailed
over the fidelity of the time events. I mean it takes three years plus
and it compresses it into two and a half hours. It deals with the truth.
Did a tobacco company intimidate a media company -- CBS at this case --
with a multi-billion dollar suit to avoid telling the truth? Yes, that
happened. Are there multiple people in there responsible? I think so. I
think Lowell Bergman fought a unique battle within CBS to get the story
aired. I think Attorney General Moore fought a battle in his own state.
The attorneys, in the beginning, were classified as fools. And to have a
movie in the end is kind of like the icing on the cake, the ultimate
vindication.
STEWART:We have very little time, but I would like to ask you at
the end, after all the hell you've been through in this, do you ever
wish that you just kept your mouth shut?
WIGAND: No.
STEWART: Just gone away?
WIGAND: No.
STEWART: No regrets at all from this?
WIGAND: I have no regrets. I think it will build a healthy and
better future for our children.
STEWART: Doctor, thanks very much for joining us.
WIGAND: Thank you Brian.
STEWART: It's been a pleasure.
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STEWART: Mr. Descoteaux, thank you for joining us on a busy day.
It seems document after document makes it very clear that the industry
was trying to manipulate nicotine to keep people hooked and also to draw
on younger smokers. How do you react?
MICHEL DESCOTEAUX / IMPERIAL TOBACCO: Yes, that's true; you're
right. I mean this is the portrayal of our documents that has been made
in the media, thanks to the activities and the interpretations given
these documents by anti- tobacco activists. Unfortunately, these
interpretations are wrong.
STEWART: Well where are they wrong?
DESCOTEAUX: And they mislead the public. Well they are wrong
because we never, for example, spiked our tobacco -- our cigarettes --
with extra nicotine. We never targeted, in our marketing activities,
smokers who were below the legal age for smoking. All of that is wrong.
STEWART: I'm looking at one document here, a research document
prepared for Imperial Tobacco in the mid-80's, suggesting a target
group: men, 12 to 17. I mean if that's not children, youth, what is?
DESCOTEAUX: No. Well thank you very much for bringing that up,
because this is exactly a typical example of the kind of
misrepresentations that have been made by anti-tobacco activists. This
very document -- and I know for sure that it is the one because, because
of this 12 to 17 age bracket that you give -- has been explained before
the courts about 10 years ago, in public and under oath, by our vice-
president of marketing, Mr. Don Brown. And he said, at the time, that
this was not our target for our advertising campaigns. In effect, what
he explained to the judge, at the time, is that even before we would
apply these age brackets, which dealt with the readership of various
publications; even before we applied that in our activities, we had
removed from the list of possible publications to use any one that was
directed at people who were not at least of the legal age status, in
those days, 16 years.
STEWART: What do you make of allegations by those like Dr.
Wigand, which say it was very clearly the industry was targeting young
smokers, because if you didn't get them young, you weren't going to get
them at all and that this has been a consistent strategy for decades?
DESCOTEAUX: Frankly, I don't know where Dr. Wigand gets his
information, because he never worked for Imperial Tobacco; he doesn't
know how Imperial Tobacco works and frankly, I would question his
knowledge of our policies and of our activities. We never did it.
STEWART: What about the government's role in this? They're very
clearly disturbed; they very clearly believe these documents point to a
record of attempted deception.
DESCOTEAUX: Well I am surprised. You say they are "clearly
disturbed." I don't know why they would be disturbed, because frankly
there are no secrets in the way we conduct our affair. I mean we have
been releasing to the federal government for at least 10 years; both any
additives that might be used in our products and the smoke measurements
that appear on the sides of the tobacco packages. We have released smoke
components in cigarettes sold in BC in 1998, following in that the
requirements of local legislation, and we've put it on the Internet for
everyone to see. And I invite you to visit our site and check on that.
STEWART: Do you know the document which points out, at one point
here, "the expense of an exercise to eliminate material from existing
research files which might be detrimental to the group if it was
required to be produced in an American court." In other words, attempts
by the industry to hide documents from the courts.
DESCOTEAUX: Well you cannot hide documents from the court. And if
-- I don't know specifically what it is you're referring to, but I have
heard previous accusations that have been made that we had destroyed
research documents. We responded to that, because we were concerned
about that. And what we did at the time is we were simply cleaning up
our files. And we destroyed copies of scientific research, but only
after we assured ourselves that the originals continued to be available
somewhere in the world.
STEWART: Mr. Descoteaux, we're very short on time now, but I'd
like to ask you a question. Suit after suit against the tobacco
industry; document after document hammering it; where is the industry
going to go from here and how can it respond to this barrage of attack?
DESCOTEAUX: Well frankly, today's press conference is a step in the
right direction. We are setting the record straight and we're going to
continue setting the record straight anytime we're going to be falsely
accused of anything. As to court cases, as you say, if any of these
documents come up in any of the court cases, we will explain them. And
frankly, we're not worried about having to explain our documents because
we know that we have conducted our affairs in accordance with all the
laws that are applicable and according to the ethics of business.
STEWART: Mr. Descoteaux, thanks a lot for joining us.
DESCOTEAUX: Thank you, and I hope this is going to be useful to
your viewers.
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